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Abstract
We study the e¤ect of civil conict on social capital, focusing on Ugandas experience during
the last decade. Using individual and county-level data, we document large causal e¤ects on trust
and ethnic identity of an exogenous outburst of ethnic conicts in 2002-05. We exploit two waves
of survey data from Afrobarometer 2000 and 2008, including information on socioeconomic charac-
teristics at the individual level, and geo-referenced measures of ghting events from ACLED. Our
identication strategy exploits variations in the both the spatial and ethnic intensity of ghting.
We nd that more intense ghting decreases generalized trust and increases ethnic identity. The
e¤ects are quantitatively large and robust to a number of control variables, alternative measures
of violence, and di¤erent statistical techniques involving ethnic and spatial xed e¤ects and instru-
mental variables. Controlling for the intensity of violence during the conict, we also document
that post-conict economic recovery is slower in ethnically fractionalized counties. Our ndings are
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the e¤ects of civil conict on social capital, focusing on the experience of
Uganda during the last decade. Civil conicts have persistent devastating e¤ects on economic devel-
opment (Collier and Hoe­ er 2004; Collier, Hoe­ er and Rohner 2009), and their legacy involves more
than physical and human capital destruction. Civil conicts often entail the persistent breakdown
of civic and economic cooperation within society. We are motivated here by our recent theoretical
work (Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti 2013), arguing that war leads to a collapse of trust and social
capital which in turn sows the seeds of more ethnic conict. Yet, there are also instances in which
wars appear to cement rather than destroy cooperation. Historically, wars promoted nation build-
ing in Europe (Tilly 1975). The aftermath of World War II in Western Europe was characterized by
strong institutional development involving social cooperation, renewed national identity and sustained
high economic growth (Eichengreen 2008). Interestingly, Osafo-Kwaako and Robinson (2013) nd no
evidence that warfare is associated with future state building or political centralization in Africa.
However, at a more micro level, Bellows and Miguel (2009) report evidence of positive social capital
developments in Sierra Leone after the devastating civil conict of 1991-2002.1 The goal of this paper
is to address two questions: First, is there evidence of causal e¤ects of war on inter-ethnic trust?
Second, how do such e¤ects di¤er across di¤erent dimensions of trust and social capital?
We document causal e¤ects of ethnic conict on trust and ethnic identity using individual, county-
level and district-level data from Uganda. An ethnic mosaic consisting of more than 50 groups, Uganda
is a natural environment for such a micro-study. Ethnic conicts have been pervasive since indepen-
dence in 1962. Since 1985, Uganda has been ruled by the National Resistance Movement (NRM) led by
Yoweri Museveni, whose main constituency is the Bantu-dominated South. His government has faced
opposition and armed rebellion in several parts of the country, especially in the "Acholiland" region
(in North Uganda), where the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) was active until 2006, and close to the
border with the Democratic Republic of Congo, where the insurgency led by the Allied Democratic
Forces (ADF) was been active until 2004.
Our empirical strategy exploits an exogenous change in the policy against internal insurgency that
occurred in 2001, after the September 11 terrorist attack. The declaration of the "war on terror"
was a turning point. In earlier years, the international community had tried to promote negotiated
settlements of the Ugandan conicts.2 In 2001, the US Patriot Act declared the LRA and the ADF
terrorist organizations. Fearing retaliation, the ruling Sudanese National Islamic Front that had o¤ered
sanctuary and military help to the LRA until then, withdrew its support to the rebel army. Musevenis
government seized this opportunity to launch a military crackdown on rebel armies in di¤erent fronts,
1Bellows and Miguel (2009) use a household survey to analyze whether people who have been victimized in the civil
war in Sierra Leone are a¤ected in their post-war behavior. In particular, they nd that more victimized people are more
likely to attend community meetings, and to join social and political groups.
2An example of this strategy is the Amnesty Act of 2000, by which the Government of Uganda granted amnesty
to all rebels who would abandon violence, renouncing to criminal prosecution or punishment for o¤enses related to the
insurgency.
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Figure 1: The gure shows the annual number of ghting events (left-hand scale) and the number of
fatalites (right-hand scale) in Uganda during 1997-2010. Source: ACLED (2011).
particularly in the regions neighboring Sudan where the LRA had lost the logistic support from
its basis in Sudanese territory. The ADF was soon annihilated and ceased any signicant military
activity within Uganda after 2004. Military action against the LRA started in March 2002, when the
army launched "Operation Iron Fist" against the rebel bases in South Sudan. The LRA responded by
attacking villages and government forces in Northern Uganda. Military activity and reprisals peaked in
2003. In 2005, the LRA moved its bases to the Democratic Republic of Congo, while the International
Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for its leader Joseph Kony. A cease-re between the LRA
and the government of Uganda was signed on September 2006, with the mediation of the autonomous
government of South Sudan.
Figure 1 shows the total number of geo-referenced ghting events and of fatalities related to the
conict between 1997 and 2010 from Armed Conicts Location Events Data (ACLED). Between 2000
and 2008 ACLED reports nearly 2500 ghting events resulting in almost 10000 fatalities. Consistent
with the narrative above, there was a sharp increase in 2002-05, followed by a decline, and very low
levels of violence have been recorded after 2006. The escalation of violence in 2002-05 is not merely an
Acholi phenomenon. A large number of conict episodes was recorded all over Uganda in this period
(see Figure 2).
We are interested in assessing the e¤ects of this surge in violence on di¤erent measures of trust
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and ethnic identity. To do so, we exploit two waves of survey data from Afrobarometer 2000 and
2008, a repeated cross section including information on various measures of trust and socioeconomic
characteristics at the individual level.3 Our strategy is to regress individual trust in year 2008 on
spatial measures of intensity of ghting during 2000-08, controlling for a large number of individual,
ethnic and spatial characteristics. Most important, we control for the average trust at the district
level in 2000, in order to lter out cross-district heterogeneity resulting from long-standing factors.4
We address concerns about reverse causality and omitted variables through two complementary
strategies. First, we adopt an instrumental variables strategy. Our identication relies on an external
political shock i.e., the US declaring the main rebel movements of Uganda to be terrorist organiza-
tions, and the Khartoum government withdrawing support of those groups a¤ecting the intensity of
ghting, but having no direct e¤ect on trust measures. Since political shock a¤ected the probability
of ghting di¤erentially across geographical areas, with a larger escalation of violence being observed
close to the Sudanese border, we use the distance of each county from Sudan as an instrument for the
number of ghting events.5
We also consider an alternative strategy where the identication relies on the within-county vari-
ation in conict intensity involving di¤erent ethnic groups. ACLED provides information about the
rebel groups and ethnic militias that were involved in each conict event. In most cases, these groups
can be linked to ethnic a¢ liations. We can then regress our measures of trust on the number of
ghting events involving di¤erent ethnic groups within each county, controlling for both county and
ethnic group xed e¤ects. Our hypothesis is that respondents should be a¤ected particularly by local
events involving their own ethnic group.
Our main nding is that the intensity of ghting has a negative and statistically signicant e¤ect
on "trust towards other people from Uganda". The estimated e¤ect is quantitatively large, and robust
to instrumenting ghting intensity by distance to Sudan. A one-standard-deviation increase in ghting
(corresponding to 45 additional episodes of violence) translates into a 46% standard deviation decrease
in trust (corresponding to 22 percentage points). This is a very large e¤ect, corresponding to about
half of the di¤erence between the Netherlands, the eighth most trusting country in the world, and the
three countries with the lowest trust levels (Peru, Brazil and the Philippines).
The e¤ect is stronger when ghting events involve the respondents ethnic group. Fighting has
no signicant e¤ects on "trust in known people" and on "trust in relatives", suggesting that ghting
3Although Afrobarometer also ran a survey in 2005, we decided to use the 2008 data for a variety of reasons. First,
the number of conicts was still large in 2005 (see Figure 1). Second, we are interested in persistent e¤ects of conict on
trust rather than in emotional reactions that may arise while the conict is still ongoing. Last but not least important,
there were still many refugees in 2005. This raises two issues. On the one hand, poor living conditions in refugee camps
may a¤ect trust reported by respondents. On the other hand, many people could be living in camps outside of their
counties, rendering our identication strategy invalid.
4The district of the respondent is the most disaggregated geographical information provided by the 2000 Afrobarom-
eter.
5Although this instrument is time invariant, our identication relies on the fact that such geographical characteristics
a¤ected the intensity of ghting after the September 11, 2001 shock. So, in a sense, our instrument captures an interaction
between the political shock and the geographic characteristic.
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induces distrust mainly towards people outside the ordinary social network. Moreover, people living
in counties experiencing more ghting report a large increase in a self-reported measure of "ethnic
identity", i.e., they identify themselves more strongly with their own ethnic group relative to other
forms of a¢ liation, including Ugandan nationality. This result is robust to the inclusion of ethnicity
xed e¤ects. The response is stronger for people owning a radio, who are likely to be better informed
about events associated with the conict. Moreover, the results are not driven by the Acholi region,
the most tormented by the conict between the LRA and the government. Excluding all counties of
core Acholiland does not a¤ect the estimates.
In Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti (2013), we argue that by undermining trust, conict hinders
economic cohesion in ethnically divided societies. Although a thorough empirical investigation of this
question would require a longer time span of data, in an extension we consider the economic e¤ects
of ethnic conicts. Ideally, one would like to study how the dynamics of GDP per capita at the
county level are a¤ected by exposure to conict. However, regional GDP data are not available for
Uganda. We resort to proxying these with the average intensity of nighttime light recorded by U.S.
meteorological satellites at the county level. We document an interesting interaction e¤ect: given the
intensity of ghting, post-conict economic recovery depends on the ethnic fractionalization of each
county. Fighting has a negative e¤ect on the economic situation of highly fractionalized counties four
years after the end of the conict outburst, but has no e¤ect on less fractionalized counties.
1.1 Related literature
This paper is part of a large literature on inter-ethnic conict. Earlier contributions focus on char-
acteristics of the political process (see, e.g., Horowitz 2000), while more recent formal theories study
the e¤ect of population characteristics (see, e.g., Esteban and Ray 2011, and Rohner 2011). Di¤erent
from these papers, our study suggests that ethnic identity may be endogenous relative to the conict
dynamics.6
While we examine the e¤ect of conict on social capital, over the last decade a large empirical
literature has studied the opposite channel, i.e., how di¤erent measures of ethnic diversity predict the
outbreak of civil wars.7 However, there is also a growing number of micro-level studies dealing with
the impact of conicts on human capital, in particular the educational attainment of cohorts exposed
to war, in di¤erent countries (see Akresh and de Walque 2010, Blattman and Annan 2010, Leon 2009,
Shemyakina 2011, and Swee 2008). There is also a literature in medicine documenting that child
soldiers or children who experienced war are more likely to experience depression and post-traumatic
stress or anxiety (see Barenbaum, Ruchkin and Schwab-Stone 2004, Dyregrov et al. 2000, and Derluyn
et al. 2004).
The studies above focus on human rather than social capital. More directly related to our work
6 In this sense our paper is related to a recent literature studying endogenous ethnic and political identity in various
contexts (see Balcells 2012, Caselli and Coleman 2013, Choi and Bowles 2007, Fryer and Levitt 2004, Posner 2004).
7See Fearon and Laitin (2003); Collier and Hoe­ er (2004); Collier and Rohner (2008); Collier, Hoe­ er and Rohner
(2009); Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and Esteban, Mayoral and Ray (2012).
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is the recent literature on the e¤ect of individual war experience on political participation and local
collective action (see, e.g., Bellows and Miguel 2009, Blattman 2009, and Humphreys and Weinstein
2007). Besley and Reynal-Querol (2012) study the historical legacy of pre-colonial conict in Africa
and nd that historical conict is negatively correlated with trust levels today.
There is also a conict-related literature based on lab and eld experiments, including Fearon,
Humphreys, and Weinstein (2009), Gilligan, Pasquale and Samii (2010), Miguel, Saiegh and Satyanath
(2011), Voors et al. (2012), and Whitt and Wilson (2007). Cassar, Grosjean and Whitt (2013) run
experiments in Tajikistan and nd that conict exposure reduces trusting and fair behavior, especially
in interactions with people from the same area. They explain this nding as due to the nature of the
Tajik war, in which clear frontlines were absent and much violence took place within villages.
Our paper is related also to the literature linking trust and social capital in communities to past
history and ethnic fragmentation.8 While Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) nds that participation in
social activities is lower in ethnically heterogeneous communities, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) shows
that a recent history of traumatic experiences and discrimination, poverty, low education and ethnic
diversity correlate with low trust. Ashraf and Galor (2011, 2013) link cultural diversity of societies to
their long-run development. They nd that genetic diversity has a hump-shaped e¤ect on comparative
economic development: on the one hand diversity results in more distrust, lower coordination, less
cooperation and more social unrest; on the other hand, a wider spectrum of traits makes is easier to
implement advanced technological paradigms.
Using Afrobarometer and historical data, Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) nd that individuals in
sub-Saharan African countries whose ancestors belonged to ethnicities that were subject to a high
intensity of enslavement report lower trust levels today. Our results are complementary to theirs.
While they emphasize persistent e¤ects of events that occurred long time ago, we show that large
contemporaneous shocks can change beliefs and social capital. In a similar vein, Guiso, Sapienza and
Zingales (2009) document that bilateral trust across countries depends on the number of years in which
the two countries have been in war during the last millennium. Di¤erent aspects of the relationship
between trust and growth are studied by Algan and Cahuc (2010) and Giuliano and Spilimbergo
(2009). A number of papers document that business links are more stable between people of the
same ethnic groups (Fafchamps, 2000, and Fisman 2003). These papers are related to the ndings in
our paper that ghting appears to have larger post-war economic e¤ects in ethnically fractionalized
counties.
Finally, our paper is related to the limited literature on the consequences of the conict in Uganda.
Bozzoli, Brueck and Muhumuza (2011) analyzes the e¤ect of conict on individual expectations in
Northern Uganda. Their paper is complementary to ours insofar as it documents the e¤ect of di¤er-
ential exposure to conict. However, they use a di¤erent dataset (the Northern Uganda Livelihood
Survey) which covers only the population living in six Northern districts. This survey is only available
8For a general discussion of the origins and e¤ects of trust and social capital on economic development, see the survey
articles of Doepke and Zilibotti (2013), Fehr (2009), Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006), and Sobel (2002).
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for 2007, so pre-conict attitudes cannot be controlled for. Using also data from Northern Uganda,
Fiala (2013) analyses the economic consequences of being internally displaced. A recent paper by
De Luca and Verpoorten (2011) carried out independently, and posterior to the rst version of our
paper studies the e¤ect of conict in Uganda on associational membership and trust.9 Deininger
(2003) analyzes household survey data for Uganda and nds that households more heavily a¤ected
by civil strife are less likely to engage in (non-farm) enterprise expansion or startup and are more
likely to close down an existing enterprise. Vargas Hill, Bernard and Dewina (2008) document that in
Uganda agricultural "cooperatives were much less likely (...) to exist in communities that had recently
experienced civil conict".
Section 2 provides an overview of the historical context of the Ugandan conict. Section 3 describes
the data and empirical strategy. Section 4 discusses the main empirical results regarding the e¤ect of
conict on measures of trust and ethnic identity. Section 5 performs some robustness checks. Section
6 analyzes two important extensions focusing, respectively, on spatialethnic variation in violence,
and the economic e¤ects of ethnic conict. Section 7 concludes. A number of additional statistics and
robustness tests and a detailed data description are found in the Appendix.
2 Context of Conict in Uganda
Since pre-colonial times the area of what is Uganda today has been characterized by a great ethnic
diversity. The main dividing line runs between the Nilotic people of the North, and the Bantu-
dominated South. These ethnic identities were fostered by the British colonization as part of a divide-
and-rule strategy. For instance, the colonial administration restricted inter-ethnic movements. While
Nilotic ethnic groups (and in particular the Acholi) were over-represented in the army, they were
under-represented in the administration and white-collar jobs, and generally discriminated against
(Nannyonjo 2005).
Even after independence in 1962, Ugandan politics remained dominated by ethnicity, with each
leader favored some groups, and repressed others. Ugandas rst prime minister, Milton Obote, was
overthrown by Idi Amin in 1971, whose regime was hostile to Acholi soldiers, perceived to be Obotes
agents. After Amin, it was again the turn of Obote to rule the country, who was followed by Acholi
o¢ cer Tito Okello. During this period, the dominant position of northerners in the army was re-
established, only to be dismantled again when Okello lost power in 1986 to the former rebel leader of
the National Resistance Army (NRA) and current President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, a southerner
(Finnström 2008). The northern (and in particular, Acholi) ex-o¢ cers and soldiers of the Ugandan
army fell again from grace, and have since played an important role in the various Northern-based
rebel movements. In 1987 Joseph Kony started his own militia drafting mostly Acholi deserters. This
9This study uses a di¤erent econometric specication that does not control for past trust (which play a key role in
our identication), nor does it consider ethnic identity. It is based on Afrobarometer 2005, whereas we prefer to use
Afrobarometer 2008 for reasons explained in detail below. Finally it emphasizes di¤erent outcome variables, and does
not link ghting events to specic ethnic groups.
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movement eventually became, in 1994, the most important and persistent rebel movement of Uganda,
under the name of Lords Resistance Army (LRA).
Although over time the LRA has intensied criminal activities and often attacked villages inhabited
by people from their own ethnic background  either to prosecute alleged traitors, or to force the
recruitment of child soldiers the conict has ethnic roots.10 According to Nannyonjo (2005: 475), "the
current conict in the Acholi and Lango sub-regions between the LRA and the Ugandan government
has deep historical roots resulting from ethnic hostilities...". This view is echoed by Finnström (2008:
74-75), "the majority of people in central Uganda perceived Musevenis war as a war against a regime
of northerners, rather than the war for democracy. (...) In Musevenis war propaganda, the enemy was
alleged to be northerners in general and Acholi in particular". Similarly, the Womens Commission
(2001: 81) argues that "the current conict in northern Uganda has its roots in ethnic mistrust between
the Acholi people and the ethnic groups of central and southern Uganda as well as in the religious and
spiritual beliefs of the Acholi people and the manipulation of these beliefs." The civil population in the
North su¤ered abuses from both the LRA and the government troops (Dolan 2009).11 Interestingly,
the primary blame and grievances kept being directed mostly against the Kampala government and
the southern Bantu-speaking ethnicities that it represents (Finnström 2008).
The role of Sudan is especially important. Since the early 1990s, the Khartoum government
had provided the LRA with logistic support and military equipment, allowing it to hold base camps
in southern Sudan. In exchange, the LRA helped the Sudanese army to ght the south Sudanese
rebels. The Ugandan government, in turn, supported the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army. Reciprocal
accusations led the two governments to sever diplomatic relationships in 1995. In early 1999, former
US President Jimmy Carter chaired negotiations to restore these ties (see Neu 2002). Progress was slow
until September 11, 2001, when the Sudanese government came under heavy international pressure.
In 2002 Uganda and Sudan restored diplomatic relations and signed a protocol giving the Ugandan
army the right to enter southern Sudan and attack the LRA.
Besides this major violent conict between the southern government and the northern rebels of the
Lords Resistance Army, in recent years there have been several other smaller-scale ethnic conicts in
Uganda. For example, the rebels of Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) have been ghting the government
in southwestern Uganda, and there has been widespread ethnic violence in the northeastern Karamoja
region triggered by cattle raiding (Nannyonjo 2005; Finnström 2008).
10According to Finnström (2008), the Museveni government has tried hard to frame the Lords Resistance Army as
non-politically motivated criminals who attack their own people. In particular, "the rhetoric of a local northern conict
in which Acholi kill fellow Acholi like cannibalistic grasshoppers, reects a more general Ugandan conception of the
Acholi as violent and war-prone" (Finnström 2008: 107).
11"The conduct of the Musevenis troops (...) soon deteriorated. Killings, rape, and other forms of physical abuse
aimed at noncombatants became the order of the day soon after the soldiers established themselves in Acholiland, which
was foreign territory for them" Finnström (2008: 71).
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3 Econometric Analysis
3.1 Data Sources
Our main data source is the Afrobarometer 2008 survey on Uganda, in which 2431 subjects were
surveyed between July and October 2008, in 55 districts and 125 counties of Uganda.12 Each respon-
dent is associated with a district and a county of residence, as well as with an ethnic group. We also
use information from Afrobarometer 2000. Note that the smallest geographical unit included in the
2000 survey is the district. Thus, we can only construct our control variables from this data source
(particularly, past trust and living conditions) at the district level.
The other major data source is the ACLED (Armed Conict Location and Event Dataset, 2011)
dataset, which provides precise geo-location of various categories of ghting events. In Afrobarometer,
we ignore the precise geo-location of respondents. Using ArcGIS, we consequently aggregate ghting
events both at the county- and district-level and match them with the county and district of residence
of Afrobarometer respondents.
All variables are described in detail in the Data Appendix, and the descriptive statistics of all
variables used are contained in Table 16 in the Appendix. We describe here the main variables.
3.2 Main Variables
Dependent variables: We use mainly two questions from Afrobarometer 2008 to construct the
following dependent (binary) variables at the individual level:
 Generalized trust : "How much do you trust each of the following types of people: Other Ugan-
dans?" (question Q84C). The variable takes the value one if the respondent answers either "I
trust them somewhat" or "I trust them a lot". Otherwise, the value is set to zero.
 Ethnic identity : "Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Ugandan and being
a _ [Rs Ethnic Group]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings?" (question Q83).
The variable takes the value one if the respondent answers either "I feel only (Rs ethnic group)"
or "I feel more (Rs ethnic group) than Ugandan". Otherwise, the value is set to zero.
In section 5.4, we also consider the following two alternative questions:
 Trust in known people: "How much do you trust each of the following types of people: Other
people you know?" (question Q84B). The variable takes the value one if the respondent answers
either "I trust them somewhat" or "I trust them a lot". Otherwise, the value is set to zero.
12Afrobarometer selects samples in the following way: "The sample is designed as a representative cross-section of all
citizens of voting age in a given country. The goal is to give every adult citizen an equal and known chance of selection
for interview. We strive to reach this objective by (a) strictly applying random selection methods at every stage of
sampling and by (b) applying sampling with probability proportionate to population size wherever possible (...). The
sample is stratied by key social characteristics in the population such as sub-national area (e.g. region/province) and
residential locality (urban or rural)" (Afrobarometer 2011).
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 Trust in relatives: "How much do you trust each of the following types of people: Your relatives?"
(question Q84A). The variable takes the value one if the respondent answers either "I trust them
somewhat" or "I trust them a lot". Otherwise, the value is set to zero.
In section 4 we denote our dependent variable by TRUST 08 2{ Generalized trust, Ethnic identity,
Trust in known people, Trust in relatives}. In section 6.2, we run a regression where the dependent
variable is a proxy for the level of economic activity. In particular, we use Satellite nightlight, a county-
level measure of the average nighttime light intensity. We constructed this measure with the help of
ArcGIS, using the geo-referenced county border and the geo-referenced Satellite Nightlight Data from
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2010). These data have been used in recent
research as a proxy for economic activity (see, e.g., Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil 2012, and Hodler
and Raschky 2011).
Main explanatory variables: We use four alternative explanatory variables with variation at
the county-level (at the district-level in several specications), FIGHTING00 08c 2{ All Fighting,
Violence Against Civilians, Battles, Internally Displaced People}. All variables code ghting events
taking place between the last day of the Afrobarometer 2000 survey (on June 26, 2000) and the rst
day of the Afrobarometer 2008 survey (on July 27, 2008).
 All Fighting (main explanatory variable): Total amount of all violent events in a county. It
corresponds to the sum of the events of the following "Event Type" in ACLED: "Battle-
Government regains territory", "Battle-No change of territory", "Battle-Rebels gain territory",
"Riots/Protests", and "Violence against civilians".
 Violence Against Civilians: Total number of events coded as "Violence against civilians" in
ACLED.13
 Battles: Total number of events coded as "Battle-Government regains territory", "Battle-No
change of territory", and "Battle-Rebels gain territory" in ACLED.
 Internally Displaced People (IDP): Total number of internally displaced people per district in
2006 from UNHCR (2006).
As default in most specications, we focus on the number of events of the three ghting variables
above (All Fighting, Violence Against Civilians, and Battles), we also run as robustness checks the
corresponding regressions for these three ghting categories, but focusing on the number of fatalities
taking place in the ghting events of a given category.
In an alternative specication (section 6.1), we use the information provided by ACLED to match
(whenever feasible) each event coded in All ghting to a particular ethnic group according to the
13Examples of violence against civilians in the ACLED database for Uganda include e.g. di¤erent ethnic clans attacking
each other in cattle raids, rebel ambushes of passenger vehicles, or rebel raids against villages supposed to support the
enemy.
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classication of Afrobarometer 2008 (Q79). In this alternative specication, All ghting varies on the
ethnic group level, and corresponds to the total number of violent events linked to a group.
Primary control variables: We dene as "primary" control variables the ones that have a key
role in our identication strategy, since (as explained below) these allow us to lter out heterogeneity
in the pre-treatment stage. The primary control variables is a vector of trust/identity variables from
Afrobarometer 2000, denoted by TRUST00={Generalized trust 2000, Trust in Known People 2000,
Trust in relatives 2000, Ethnic identity 2000}. The variation of TRUST00 is at the district level.
The questions asked in Afrobarometer 2000 were not identical to those asked in Afrobarometer
2008. The exact construction of the 2000 variables is deferred to Appendix B. In section 6.2, the
dependent variable is Satellite Nightlight, and we control for its analogue in year 2000.
Ethnic control variables: In some tables, we also control for a number of ethnic-specic time-
invariant control variables:
 Slavery is borrowed from Nunn and Wantchekon (2011). It measures the number of people who
were enslaved during the slave trade period (1400-1900) in each ethnic group, normalized by the
area of land inhabited by the group during the 19th century. This is Nunn and Wantchekons
preferred measure of slave trade incidence.
 Hunting indicates the traditional ethnic-specic dependence on hunting (including trapping and
fowling). This variable is borrowed from Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) as are the
three variables listed below. It corresponds to variable v2 of the Ethnographic Atlas of Murdock
(1967). The variable is measured on a cardinal scale between 0 and 9, where a larger number
means more dependence (the same scale is used for the three variables listed below).
 Fishing indicates the traditional ethnic-group specic dependence on shing (including shell sh-
ing and the pursuit of large aquatic animals). It corresponds to variable v3 of the Ethnographic
Atlas of Murdock (1967).
 Animal husbandry indicates the traditional ethnic-group specic dependence on animal hus-
bandry. It corresponds to variable v4 of the Ethnographic Atlas of Murdock (1967).
 Agriculture indicates the traditional ethnic-group specic dependence on agriculture (including
penetration of the soil, planting, tending the growing crops, and harvesting). It corresponds to
variable v5 of the Ethnographic Atlas of Murdock (1967).
Note that together with the omitted category "Gathering", the scores of the activities "Hunting",
"Fishing", "Animal husbandry" and "Agriculture" sum up to 100% of the traditional food dependence.
Other control variables: All regressions include a vector of individual sociodemographic controls
(X) from Afrobarometer 2008, consisting of age, education, employment status, gender, rural/urban
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location, religion and ownership of a radio and of a TV; and a vector of district-level controls (Z)
including population, urbanization rate, demographic structure, share of manufacture, share of subsis-
tence farming, net migration, fertility, number of micro-enterprises, and unemployment, all of which
are from the Census of the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics (2002). These data are not available at the
county level. Further, we use the Geo-Referenced Ethnic Group (GREG) dataset, which allows us to
compute ethnic fractionalization measures at the county level (Weidmann, Rød and Cederman 2010).
Finally, we proxy for living conditions in 2000 using the county-level average satellite nightlight inten-
sity, computed based on data from satellites of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(2010).
3.3 Empirical Strategy
We consider the following benchmark econometric model:
P(TRUST 08i;c;e = 1) = 

a0 + a1FIGHTING
00 08
c +TRUST
000
d +ETHNIC
0
e +X
0
i + Z
0
c

(1)
where i denotes an individual, c a county (where a county is a sub-unit of a district, d), and e an
ethnic group.
We will estimate (i) Probit maximum likelihood models and (ii) linear probability models using
either the ordinary least squares (OLS) or the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator, in presence of
instrumental variables. Hence,  in equation (1) is either the cdf of a standard normal distribution (in
the Probit model) or the identity function. TRUST 08 yields the di¤erent measures of trust/identity
from Afrobarometer 2008. FIGHTING00 08c is our main explanatory variable. In the set of tables
below, we always report the estimated coe¢ cient a1 capturing the e¤ect of county-level ghting on
trust/identity. In some specications we change the scale of analysis by considering FIGHTING00 08d ;
a measure of ghting at the district rather than at the county level. We also consider an alternative
independent variable, FATALITIES00 08c , counting the number of casualties (as opposed to the
number of ghting events) for the same categories of violence as for the FIGHTING00 08c variable.
FATALITIES00 08c may be a more precise treatment measure, since it is correlated with the conict
intensity.
The primary control variables TRUST00d (a vector) is designed to lter out heterogeneity in the
pre-treatment measures of trust at the geographic or ethnic group level. This variable plays a key role
in our identication strategy. Ideally, since our aim is to identify the causal e¤ect of shocks taking place
between the two Afrobarometer surveys, we would like to control for individual measures of trust in
2000. However, this is not possible since Afrobarometer is not a panel at the individual level. Filtering
out the e¤ect of past trust at the district level, TRUST00d yields the best approximation of this ideal
specication. Since part of the time-invariant heterogeneity may be rooted at the ethnic rather than
at the geographical level, we lter out heterogeneity in long-term trust across ethnic groups by a set of
ethnic-specic control variables ETHNICe. These include Slavery following Nunn and Wantchekon
(2011) who show that an ethnic history of enslavement has a large and signicant explanatory power
12
Figure 2: The gure shows the districts and counties of Uganda and the location of ghting events.
The bold black lines display the district borders whose names are also listed in the map. The thin
grey lines show the county borders. The circles correspond to the locations of ghting events between
2000 and 2008 (from ACLED, 2011).
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on the average level of trust exhibited by people belonging to di¤erent ethnic groups in Afrobarometer
2005. In addition, we control for the traditional ethnic-specic dependence on the traditional activities
of hunting, shing, animal husbandry and agriculture from Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013), as
described above. Finally, in some specications we include ethnic xed e¤ects. In this case, we omit
ethnic controls, since these are collinear with the xed e¤ects.
We introduce a set of additional individual sociodemographic control variables (Xi) and county-
(when available) or district-level controls (Zc) to lter out additional sources of heterogeneity. All
district-level controls are from the Census 2002, and therefore are measured before the outburst
of conict in 2002-05. This reduces concerns about their endogeneity. We also control for ethnic
fractionalization and for nightlight measured using satellites for the year 2000 at the county level. We
allow for intracluster correlation of the error terms both in the spatial and ethnic dimensions.
OLS and Probit regressions may yield inconsistent estimates of a1; due to either reverse causality
or omitted variables bias. We address this concern through an instrumental variable strategy. Concern
about reverse causality is mitigated by the fact that our dependent variable is measured in 2008, three
years past the end of active ghting. This is one of the reasons why we do not focus on Afrobarometer
2005, which surveys Ugandan people while ghting is either still ongoing or a very recent experience
(see Figure 1). However, reverse causality cannot be ruled out completely if variables are serially
correlated. Perhaps more importantly, unobservable shocks occurring after year 2000 may be driving
both trust and ghting. To this aim, we instrument FIGHTING00 08c by a county-level geographic
characteristic that is correlated with the ghting intensity, while having, plausibly, no direct e¤ect
on trust. We focus in particular on the Distance to Sudan.14 This is a natural instrument, since
Southern Sudan played a crucial role in the 2002-05 military escalation. In particular, before 2001
this region used to be a safe haven for rebel movements most notably for the LRA. However, the
events following September 11 forced the Sudanese government to withdraw its support of the LRA
and to let the Ugandan army attack the LRA bases in Sudanese territory. This triggered the response
of the LRA with repeated incursions, looting and engagements with the army within the Ugandan
territory.15
Our exclusion restriction requires the error term to be uncorrelated with the instrument. In this
respect, it is important to remember that our primary control variables (TRUST00d ), and the ethnic
controls, should lter out the long-run correlation between our instrument and potential omitted
factors. For instance, if counties (or ethnicities) neighboring Sudan were less inclined to trust and
cooperation due to unobserved historical or cultural factors, these factors might have a direct e¤ect
on TRUST 08: However, they would also a¤ect TRUST00d ; and as long as their inuence did not
change after 2000 (other than due to ghting), the instrument would be uncorrelated with the omitted
14We construct this variable by computing with ArcGIS the minimum distance between the geo-referenced border of
a given county and the geo-referenced border of Sudan.
15 If we had a longer span of data and a full dynamic model, the instrument would be the interaction between September
11 and "distance to Sudan". Note that "distance to Sudan" could have a direct permanent e¤ect on trust (if, e.g., Acholi
people trust the Kampala government less than do people in the rest of Uganda). However, this e¤ect is ltered out by
TRUST 00d : See the discussion below.
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variables conditional on the observables which include TRUST00d . To the opposite, problems would
arise if the error term included time varying shocks that are correlated with the geographical variables.
An example might be a weather shock during the period 2000-08. However, we could not nd evidence
of any such remarkable event. In section 6.1 below, we consider a more demanding identication where
we control for ethnic and county-level xed e¤ects.
Finally, a possible concern is conict-induced migration: in 2008, some people may be living in
di¤erent counties from where they lived at the time of the conict when massive forced population
displacements occurred. However, this issue is quantitatively minor. First, by 2008 the majority of
displaced people had returned to their home villages (see UN 2009; UNHCR 2010). In contrast, the
problem would have been important if we had used Afrobarometer 2005, since the number of people
living in refugee camps peaked at 1.8 millions in 2005. This is one of the main reasons why we rely
on Afrobarometer 2008. Second, most movements took place within counties. People were forced
to move from rural areas to so-called protected villagesestablished mostly in local trading centers
(UNOCHA 2002, Médecins sans frontières 2004). As a result, cross-county migration is altogether
modest. Given that our main explanatory variable is dened at the county-level, the results are
unlikely to be contaminated by cross-county conict-induced migration.
4 Results
Table 1 presents the results of a set of probit estimations. We only report the estimated marginal e¤ects
of the main coe¢ cient of interest, i.e., FIGHTING00 08c in columns (1)(3), and FATALITIES00 08c
in columns (4)(6). The regressions in columns (1) and (4) control only for county (or district) and
individual characteristics. The results show a signicant negative e¤ect of ghting on general trust.
Controlling for time-invariant ethnic characteristics that can a¤ect trust reduces the estimated e¤ect
from -1.97 to -1.06 in column (2) and from -0.49 to -0.32 in column (5). Finally, in columns (3) and
(6) we control for ethnic xed e¤ects. This is a very demanding specication because it identies
exclusively within-ethnicity e¤ects of conict, while in reality an important e¤ect of conict may be
to exacerbate ethnic rivalries. Not surprisingly, the marginal e¤ects are now smaller: ethnic xed
e¤ects absorb about half of the e¤ects in columns (1) and (4). However, the estimated coe¢ cients
remain statistically signicant, at the 10% level in the case of ghting and at the 1% level in the case
of fatalities.
The e¤ect of our primary control variable, TRUST00d ; (coe¢ cients not reported in Table 1) is
interesting. Generalized trust is highly positively correlated with its district-level counterpart in Afro-
barometer 2000 (which is, recall, a component of the vector TRUST00d ): the regression coe¢ cient of
"Generalized trust 2000" ranges between 0.79 and 1.44 across the di¤erent specications, and is always
signicant at the 1% level. Such a high autocorrelation is reassuring, as it suggests that TRUST00d
indeed lters out well the pre-conict level of trust.16
16The coe¢ cient of Slavery in columns (2) and (5) is, as expected, consistently negative: individuals belonging to
groups highly exposed to enslavement in the eighteenth century report a lower Generalized trust in 2008, ceteris paribus.
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In summary, the probit regressions show that people living in counties where ghting has been
more intense and has caused a higher number of fatalities turned on average less trustful towards other
Ugandans relative to year 2000. The e¤ect is robust to the inclusion of several controls and ethnic
xed e¤ects.
Since there are concerns of reverse causality or omitted variables bias (as discussed above), Table 2
reports the results of an instrumental variable method. We only report the estimated marginal e¤ects
of the main coe¢ cient of interest, i.e., FIGHTING00 08c in Panel A, and FATALITIES00 08c in
Panel B. In columns (1)-(3) of Panel A (Panel B) we report the results of the same specication as
in columns (1)-(3) (columns (4)-(6)) in Table 1, using a OLS regression. The coe¢ cients of the OLS
regressions are similar in magnitude to the corresponding marginal e¤ects of the Probit model. Note
that using OLS and 2SLS also allows us to two-way cluster standard errors at the ethnic group and
county level, which we do throughout the paper for all OLS and 2SLS regressions. Columns (4)-(6)
of Panel A (Panel B) run the same specication as in columns (1)-(3) (columns (4)-(6)) in Table 1,
but using a 2SLS regression. Columns (7)(8) in Panel A (Panel B) report the results from 2SLS
regressions using di¤erent measures of the intensity of ghting (fatalities) as the primary regressors.
Further, in column (9) of Panel A we use internally displaced people as primary regressor (since this
regression has no counterpart with fatalities, Panel B has only eight columns).
The coe¢ cients of All ghting in the 2SLS regressions are negative and signicant. The results
are robust to the alternative measures of ghting, including Violence Against Civilians (column (7)
of Panel A) and Battles (column (8) of Panel A). It is also robust to using the same measures,
though it counts the number of fatalities involved as opposed to the number of events, as shown in
Panel B. Finally, in column (9) of Panel A we show that the results are also robust to replacing the
measure of ghting intensity with the number of internally displaced people.17 We interpret the larger
coe¢ cients in the 2SLS specications with respect to their OLS counterparts as originating from two
related sources. First, the OLS may su¤er from an attenuation bias in the OLS regressions due to
measurement error. Second, the OLS coe¢ cient corresponds to the average e¤ect of the number of
ghting events, FIGHTING00 08c . However, trust and ethnic identity are likely to respond to the
intensity of the treatment (violence), which varies across counties. For instance, the county-level
average fatalities per ghting event is highly negatively correlated with our instrumental variable,
distance to Sudan, the correlation coe¢ cient being -0.29. This observation suggests that even other
non-observable dimensions of violence intensity (such as looting, kidnapping, permanently injured
people, etc.) are likely to be correlated with our geographical instrument. More generally, if each
The point estimates range between -0.65 and -0.66, being on the margin of standard levels of statistical signicance (the
p-values range between 0.116 and 0.128 across the di¤erent specications). The fact that the e¤ect of slavery is smaller
than in Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) is not surprising, since our regressions control for trust in 2000 which lters out
most of the long-term variation. Consistent with this interpretation, Slavery becomes statistically signicant if we omit
TRUST00d .
17We include IDP for two reasons: First, they are a proxy of ghting intensity. Second, forced displacements can be
viewed as a deliberate military strategy in conict (cf. Esteban, Morelli and Rohner 2011). Indeed, some authors see the
protected villages for IDP in Uganda as part of an aggressive military strategy pursued by the Museveni government to
control and oppress the civilian population in the North (Finnström 2008; Dolan 2009).
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Dependent variable: Generalized Trust in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All fighting -1.97*** -1.06** -0.85* -0.49*** -0.32*** -0.28***
(0.50) (0.52) (0.51) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10)
Fighting variable Events Events Events Fatalities Fatalities Fatalities
Ethnic controls No Ethnic variables Ethnic FE No Ethnic variables Ethnic FE
Method Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Observations 2242 2131 2234 2242 2131 2234
Pseudo R-squared 0.101 0.116 0.146 0.102 0.118 0.148
Note: The unit of observation is an individual. Robust standard errors in parenthesis (adjusted for clustering at county level).
Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All specifications control for unreported individual sociodemographics (Age,
Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV, Own Radio, 17 Religion Fixed Effects), districts characteristics at the beginning of the
period (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urbanization, Age-Dependency-Ratio, Share of
Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming, Net Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises, Adjusted Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment
Rate), and county characteristics at the beginning of the period (Ethnic Fractionalization, Nightlight).
Table 1: E¤ect of Fighting on Generalized Trust in 2008.
ghting event (even each fatality) is associated, on average, with more intense violence in counties
close to Sudan, this can explain why the 2SLS coe¢ cients are larger than the OLS ones, which are
based on an average e¤ect.18
We also checked for possible selection problems following the procedure suggested by Altonji, Elder,
and Taber (2005) aimed to gauge the amount of selection on unobservable characteristics based on the
amount of selection on the observed explanatory variables.19 This allows one to assess how severe the
omitted variable bias should be for the e¤ect of ghting to be driven fully by unobserved characteristics.
We nd no indication that our results arise, spuriously, from a selection on unobservables. To the
opposite, adding control variables appears to increase (in absolute value) the size of the estimated
coe¢ cient, suggesting that our result would be strengthened if we could control for more unobservable
variables.
18Consistent with this interpretation, the bias of the OLS coe¢ cient is smaller when we measure violence by the
number of fatalities than when we use the number of ghting episodes, see Panel b of Table 2. The reason is that
fatalities is a better (albeit imperfect) measure of the intensity of violence.
19We run two regressions: one with a restricted set of control variables and one with a full set of controls. The restricted
set of controls consists of the primary controls, TRUST00d and ETHNICe (i.e., we exclude Xi and Zd in equation 1) -
both are essential constituents of our econometric specication. Then, we calculate the ratio ja^1j =
 a^R1   ja^1j ; where
a^1 is the estimated coe¢ cient with the full set of controls and the alternative options for ETHNICe (columns 1-3 in
Table 2), while a^R1 is the estimated coe¢ cient with the restricted set of controls. In absence of ethnic controls we obtain
a^R1 =  1:02; implying that
a^R1  < ja^1j (since a^1 =  2:10). With ethnic covariates we get a^R1 =  0:73 (a^1 =  1:12) and
with ethnic xed e¤ects a^R1 =  0:45 (a^1 =  0:94). In none of the three cases is the point estimate attenuated by the
inclusion of the full set of controls. In fact, such inclusion increases the absolute value of the point estimate.
Note that the power of this robustness test depends on the explanatory power of the observable characteristics that
are included. In our case, 17 out of the 34 additional control variables are signicant at the 5 percent level and their
inclusion increases the R-squared by 0.04 (with small variations across the alternative options for ETHNICe).
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Panel A: Events
Dependent variable: Generalized Trust in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
All fighting -2.10*** -1.12* -0.94* -4.34*** -4.08* -4.70**
(0.75) (0.64) (0.53) (1.22) (2.23) (2.27)
Violence Civil. -11.37**
(5.53)
Battles -7.70**
(3.83)
IDP -0.87**
(0.38)
Ethnic controls No Ethn. Var. Ethnic FE No Ethn. Var. Ethnic FE Ethnic FE Ethnic FE Ethnic FE
Method OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 2252 2141 2252 2252 2141 2252 2252 2252 2252
R-squared 0.128 0.145 0.181 0.112 0.125 0.155 0.154 0.155 0.186
Note: The unit of observation is an individual. Robust standard errors in parenthesis (adjusted for two-way clustering at county and
ethnicity level). Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All specifications control for unreported individual
sociodemographics (Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV, Own Radio, 17 Religion Fixed Effects), districts characteristics
at the beginning of the period (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urbanization, Age-
Dependency-Ratio, Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming, Net Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises, Adjusted Total
Fertility Rate, Unemployment Rate), and county characteristics at the beginning of the period (Ethnic Fractionalization, Nightlight).
Panel B: Fatalities
Dependent variable: Generalized Trust in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All fighting -0.53*** -0.35** -0.32* -0.99*** -0.66* -0.90**
(0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.30) (0.35) (0.42)
Violence Civil. -1.63**
(0.81)
Battles -1.95**
(0.90)
Ethnic controls No Ethn. Var. Ethnic FE No Ethn. Var. Ethnic FE Ethnic FE Ethnic FE
Method OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 2252 2141 2252 2252 2141 2252 2252 2252
R-squared 0.128 0.148 0.183 0.118 0.144 0.171 0.172 0.160
Note: The unit of observation is an individual. Robust standard errors in parenthesis (adjusted for two-way clustering at
county and ethnicity level). Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All specifications control for unreported
individual sociodemographics (Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV, Own Radio, 17 Religion Fixed Effects),
districts characteristics at the beginning of the period (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic
Identity, Population, Urbanization, Age-Dependency-Ratio, Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming, Net
Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises, Adjusted Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment Rate), and county characteristics
at the beginning of the period (Ethnic Fractionalization, Nightlight).
Table 2: E¤ect of Fighting on Generalized Trust in 2008 (Second Stage).
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Dependent variable: Ethnic Identity in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All fighting 0.69* 0.39 0.45* 0.18** 0.14** 0.12**
(0.36) (0.30) (0.27) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
Fighting variable Events Events Events Fatalities Fatalities Fatalities
Ethnic controls No Ethnic variables Ethnic FE No Ethnic variables Ethnic FE
Method Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Observations 2256 2145 2217 2256 2145 2217
Pseudo R-squared 0.056 0.072 0.087 0.056 0.072 0.087
Note: The unit of observation is an individual. Robust standard errors in parenthesis (adjusted for clustering at county level).
Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All specifications control for unreported individual sociodemographics (Age,
Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV, Own Radio, 17 Religion Fixed Effects), districts characteristics at the beginning of the
period (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urbanization, Age-Dependency-Ratio, Share of
Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming, Net Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises, Adjusted Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment
Rate), and county characteristics at the beginning of the period (Ethnic Fractionalization, Nightlight).
Table 3: E¤ect of Fighting on Ethnic Identity in 2008.
4.1 Ethnic identity
To test more directly whether conicts a¤ect inter-ethnic attitudes, we replace our measure of trust by
Ethnic identity, i.e., the proportion of respondents who identify themselves primarily with their ethnic
a¢ liation. The results are reported in Tables 3 and 4, corresponding to Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
The estimated coe¢ cient of interest is always positive and in most cases highly signicant.20 As in
the case of Generalized trust, the coe¢ cients in the 2SLS regressions are signicantly larger than their
OLS counterpart. Violence strengthens the identication of Ugandans with their own ethnic group.
4.2 First stage regression
Table 5 reports the coe¢ cients of the excluded instruments in the rst-stage regressions of 2SLS
specications from Table 2. In particular, columns (1)(5) (columns (6)-(10)) in Table 5 correspond
to the regressions of columns (4)(8) in Panel A (Panel B) of Table 2; nally column (11) in Table
5 corresponds to the regression of columns (9) in Panel A of Table 2. In all cases the IV coe¢ cients
have the expected sign and are highly signicant. Robust (Kleibergen-Paap) F-statistics accounting for
clustered residuals are large, and in most cases above the conventional threshold for weak instruments.
The specications with ethnicity xed e¤ects are generally more problematic, and the F-statistics
show in some cases possible weak instrument problems. This is not surprising, since ethnic groups
are spatially clustered, limiting the explanatory power of the geographical excluded instrument in the
20We repeated the Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) procedure to detect problems of selection on unobservables. The
restricted regression yields with no ethnic control a^R1 = 0:33 (a^1 = 0:74 in column (1) of Table 4), with ethnic covariates
a^R1 = 0:35 (with a^1 = 0:43 in col. 2), and with ethnic xed e¤ects, a^
R
1 = 0:25 (with a^1 = 0:49 in col. 3). Thus, again,
selection on unobservables does not appear to drive our results.
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Panel A: Events
Dependent variable: Ethnic Identity in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
All fighting 0.74** 0.43** 0.49** 2.94*** 4.05*** 4.23***
(0.37) (0.21) (0.22) (1.03) (1.54) (1.29)
Violence Civil. 10.26***
(2.52)
Battles 6.93***
(2.39)
IDP 0.79***
(0.19)
Ethnic controls No Ethn. Var. Ethnic FE No Ethn. Var. Ethnic FE Ethnic FE Ethnic FE Ethnic FE
Method OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 2259 2148 2259 2259 2148 2259 2259 2259 2259
R-squared 0.059 0.076 0.094 0.039 0.036 0.060 0.059 0.060 0.088
Note: The unit of observation is an individual. Robust standard errors in parenthesis (adjusted for two-way clustering at county and
ethnicity level). Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All specifications control for unreported individual
sociodemographics (Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV, Own Radio, 17 Religion Fixed Effects), districts characteristics
at the beginning of the period (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urbanization, Age-
Dependency-Ratio, Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming, Net Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises, Adjusted Total
Fertility Rate, Unemployment Rate), and county characteristics at the beginning of the period (Ethnic Fractionalization, Nightlight).
Panel B: Fatalities
Dependent variable: Ethnic Identity in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All fighting 0.19** 0.15** 0.12*** 0.67*** 0.66*** 0.81***
(0.08) (0.07) (0.03) (0.20) (0.19) (0.22)
Violence Civil. 1.47***
(0.44)
Battles 1.76***
(0.53)
Ethnic controls No Ethn. Var. Ethnic FE No Ethn. Var. Ethnic FE Ethnic FE Ethnic FE
Method OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 2259 2148 2259 2259 2148 2259 2259 2259
R-squared 0.059 0.077 0.094 0.043 0.061 0.071 0.070 0.064
Note: The unit of observation is an individual. Robust standard errors in parenthesis (adjusted for two-way clustering at
county and ethnicity level). Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All specifications control for unreported
individual sociodemographics (Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV, Own Radio, 17 Religion Fixed Effects),
districts characteristics at the beginning of the period (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic
Identity, Population, Urbanization, Age-Dependency-Ratio, Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming, Net
Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises, Adjusted Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment Rate), and county characteristics
at the beginning of the period (Ethnic Fractionalization, Nightlight).
Table 4: E¤ect of Fighting on Ethnic Identity in 2008 (Second Stage).
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rst-stage regression. Nevertheless, it is reassuring that the F-statistics are well above ten when the
intensity of ghting is measured by the number of fatalities (columns (6)-(10)).
One should recall here, though, that the standard Stock-Yogo critical values for weak instruments
are calibrated for the case of i.i.d. residuals, and do not apply to the case of clustered standard errors
(see, e.g., Bun and de Haan, 2010). Therefore, the F-statistics provide no precise diagnostic of the
weak instrument problem.
As additional diagnostics, we follow the procedure suggested by Angrist and Pischke (2009: 212-
13). The results are in Appendix A. Table 10 reports the coe¢ cient of All ghting in the second
stage regression, along with a number of statistics of the rst-stage regressions from a variety of
specications and estimation techniques. Columns (1)-(3) show the robustness of the benchmark
second-stage estimates (columns (4)-(6) in Panel A of Table 2; columns (1)-(3) in Table 5) to the use
of a LIML estimator. This estimator is less e¢ cient, but also less biased when instruments are weak.
The fact that the results are almost identical suggests no bias due to weak instruments. In columns
(4)-(6), we run a reduced-form regression. The coe¢ cient of the excluded instrument has the expected
sign and is statistically signicant, which is again reassuring. Finally, in column (7) we report the
results of a specication where we collapse all variables to the county level. We include the standard
set of district and county controls (but drop all individual controls). The results are similar to the
benchmark specication using individual level variables. In this specication, standard errors are not
clustered, allowing us to compute standard Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistics for i.i.d. residuals which
can be compared to the Stock-Yogo bounds. We obtain F=17.4. We conclude that our analysis is
not subject to a weak instrument problem. In the two panels of table 11 in the Appendix we display
the analogues of the rst-stage results as in Tables 5 and 10 when the dependent variable is ethnic
identity.21
4.3 Exclusion restriction
We run a number of placebo tests on the credibility of our exclusion restriction.
Consider, rst, Figure 3. The rst panel displays counties characterized by a positive number of
ghting episodes, while the second panel shows counties in which no ghting occurred. Each gure
plots on the horizontal axis the distance from Sudan, and on the vertical axis the county-level average
of generalized trust ltered by the set of control variables (without including the large battery of
religion and ethnic xed e¤ects due to the relatively small number of observations). Remarkably, the
relationship is positive and highly signicant across counties experiencing violence, but is insignicant
across those experiencing no violence. Though not a formal test of the validity of our exclusion
21 In the Appendix Table 15 we also report the benchmark IV estimates of Generalized trust (Panel A of Table 2) and
Ethnic identity (Panel A of Table 4) with and without ethnic xed e¤ectsusing IV-Probit, which leads to very similar
results as in Tables 2 and 4.
Finally, our main results also hold when the generalized trust variable is not coded as a binary variable, but left in its
original ordinal scale. In this case, one can use an Ordered Probit estimator. However, the results of this specication
are not robust to the inclusion of ethnic xed e¤ects.
21
Dep. var: All fight. All fight. All fight. Viol. Civ. Battles All fight. All fight. All fight. Viol. Civ. Battles IDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Dist. from Sudan -0.12*** -0.07*** -0.09*** -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.52*** -0.43*** -0.49*** -0.27*** -0.23*** -0.51***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.07) (0.08) (0.14) (0.08) (0.07) (0.16)
Fighting variable Events Events Events Events Events Fatal. Fatal. Fatal. Fatal. Fatal. IDP
Ethnic controls No Eth. Var. Ethn. FE Ethn. FE Ethn. FE No Eth. Var. Ethn. FE Ethn. FE Ethn. FE Ethn. FE
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 2252 2141 2252 2252 2252 2252 2141 2252 2252 2252 2252
R-squared 0.746 0.794 0.832 0.793 0.803 0.687 0.707 0.748 0.674 0.749 0.950
F stat. (Kl.-Paap) 19.875 12.232 8.574 10.922 7.034 59.843 32.477 14.587 13.050 10.113 9.024
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust, two-way clustered at the county and ethnicity level). Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 5: First Stage of Benchmark Regressions on Generalized Trust in 2008.
restriction, this falsication analysis suggests that distance from Sudan has an e¤ect on trust in 2008
only through the channel of recent violence. In peaceful counties, distance from Sudan is uncorrelated
with trust. The same relationship holds for ethnic identity (see Figure 4 in the Appendix).
Second, the distance from Sudan could be correlated with pre-conict levels of trust or with other
characteristics a¤ecting trust. Although we control for district-specic average levels of trust, one
might worry that this lter of the e¤ect of past trust is imperfect. To address this concern, we run
a large number of placebo regressions whose results are shown in Table 6. In Panel A we start by
running individual-level regressions whose dependent variable is the survey measure of generalized
trust (columns (1)(2)) or ethnic identity (columns (3)(4)) in 2000. These are regressed on the
county specic measure of distance from Sudan. In all panels we include no control variables in odd
columns, while we include the full set of controls and xed e¤ects in even columns. From column (5)
onwards we show the analogous placebo regressions for our standard control variables, i.e. the dis-
trict characteristics at the beginning of the period (Population, Urbanization, Age-Dependency-Ratio,
Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming, Net Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises,
Adjusted Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment Rate), and the county characteristics at the beginning
of the period (Ethnic Fractionalization, Nightlight). The estimated coe¢ cient is in most cases statis-
tically insignicant, providing reassurance that distance to Sudan does not capture spurious e¤ects of
historical di¤erences in trust or other covariates.
22
Figure 3: Distance to Sudan and Trust
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4.4 Quantitative e¤ects
The magnitude of the estimated e¤ects is large.22 The dependent variable, Generalized trust, has a
sample mean equal to 0.31 with a standard deviation of 0.46. All ghting ranges between 0 and 227
violent events with a standard deviation of 45 events. In Table 2, an estimated coe¢ cient of -4.70
in the main 2SLS regression with ethnicity xed e¤ects (column (6), Panel A) means that a one-
standard-deviation increase in All ghting (i.e., 45 additional episodes of violence) translates into a
46% decrease in the standard deviation of Generalized trust (i.e., 22 percentage points). This is a very
large e¤ect, at about half the magnitude of the di¤erence between the Netherlands (0.48), the eighth
most trusting country in world, and the three countries with the lowest trust levels (Peru, Brazil and
the Philippines (0.06)).23 The estimated e¤ect between the least and most conictive counties is a
107 percentage point increase in Generalized trust. With the more conservative main OLS estimate
(column (3), Panel A, Table 2) we obtain that a one-standard-deviation increase in All ghting leads
to a 9.2% standard deviation decrease in generalized trust; the "maximum" e¤ect of moving from
counties with no violence to the county with the highest violence corresponds to a 21 percentage
point decrease in trust towards other Ugandans. The quantitative e¤ects are similar when alternative
measures of violence are considered.
In Table 4, an estimated coe¢ cient of 4.23 in the main 2SLS regression with ethnicity xed e¤ects
(column (6), Panel A) means that a one-standard-deviation increase in All ghting translates into a
48% standard deviation increase in ethnic identity (i.e., 19 percentage points). The estimated e¤ect
between the least and most conictive districts is a 96 percentage point increase in ethnic identity.
With the more conservative OLS estimate (column (3), Panel A, Table 4) we get that a one-standard-
deviation increase in All ghting leads to a 7.1% standard deviation increase in ethnic identity. The
quantitative e¤ects are similar when alternative measures of violence are considered.
5 Robustness
In this section we perform some robustness checks. To limit the number of tables, we hone in on
the specication with ethnic xed e¤ects, the most demanding one. Also, we usually report only the
results of regressions where the intensity of ghting is measured by the count of events rather than
the number of fatalities.
22 In all the tables, the ghting variables have been rescaled by a factor 103 in order to improve readability of their
estimated coe¢ cients.
23These gures correspond to the average percentage of respondents answering "Most people can be trusted" to the
World Values Survey Question A165 "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
need to be very careful in dealing with people?". We use the average scores over the rst three waves of the World Values
Survey.
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5.1 Cross-district vs. cross-county variations
Table 7 reports the results of a subset of the regressions of Tables 2 and 4 when All ghting is measured
at the district rather than at the county level. This specication has the advantage of measuring the
dependent variable at the same level as the lagged dependent variable. Its disadvantage is that it
disposes with some information available in the data (i.e., the cross-county variation in trust within
each district in Afrobarometer 2008). Columns (1)-(6) of Panel A reproduce the Columns (1)-(6) of
Panel A of Table 2 on Generalized trust. All estimated coe¢ cients are negative, and all but one are
statistically signicant. However, they are smaller in magnitude (in absolute value) than in the cross-
county regression, and the 2SLS estimate with ethnic xed e¤ects becomes marginally insignicant.
Analogously, Columns (7)-(12) of Panel A reproduce the Columns (1)-(6) of Panel B of Table 2,
focusing on fatalities rather than events. The results are very similar.
Panel B analogously reproduces the Columns (1)-(6) of both Panels of Table 4 on Ethnic identity.
All coe¢ cients have in this case the expected positive sign, and are all highly signicant.
While the regressions of Panels (a) and (b) retain the variation of the dependent variable at the
individual level, in Panel C all information is collapsed at the district level. For this purpose, we
exclude individual control variables from the right hand side of equation (1) and collapse all the other
variables (both on the right and on the left hand sides) at their district average level. The resulting
sample consists of only 49 observations (i.e., districts), implying a low number of degrees of freedom.
In Columns (1)-(4) we have Generalized trust as the dependent variable, and display again the results
for both events and fatalities. Both the OLS and the 2SLS coe¢ cients are negative, but only the OLS
coe¢ cient is highly signicant. Columns (5)-(8) report the results of the corresponding regressions for
Ethnic identity. Here, all coe¢ cients have the expected positive sign, and are highly signicant.
The regressions of Table 7 rule out the cross-county variation. In principle, it is possible also to
run the regressions at the county level including district xed e¤ects. In this case, the coe¢ cients are
estimated exploiting the within-district variation. This specication is very demanding, since Uganda
has 125 counties and 55 districts. Thus, controlling for district xed e¤ects reduces signicantly
the sources of variation in the data from which the coe¢ cients of interest are estimated. Moreover,
the within-district variation of the instrument is very limited, since the distance from Sudan of two
contiguous counties is often similar, leading to a severe weak instrument problem. Not surprisingly,
the results are often insignicant.
In conclusion, this section shows that our results hinge on cross-district variation, although the
results are stronger when one exploits also the cross-county variation. There is a small albeit positive
contribution of the within-district variation.
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5.2 Acholiland
One might suspect that the results above are driven by Acholiland, the troubled region in the North
where most of the ghting between the government and the LRA took place. In fact, this is not the
case. In Appendix Table 12 we focus on the robustness of the benchmark 2SLS estimates of Generalized
trust (Panel A of Table 2) and Ethnic identity (Panel A of Table 4) when the identifying power of
Acholiland is mitigated. Columns (1)-(4) refer to the regression for Generalized trust. Starting out
without ethnic xed e¤ects, in column (1) we remove the counties classied as Acholi by the Geo-
Referenced Ethnic Group (GREG) dataset (Weidmann, Rød and Cederman 2010).24 In column (2)
we remove from the sample the counties classied as Acholi by the Ethnologue (ETHN) denition
of Acholiland (Lewis (ed.) 2009). Columns (3) and (4) are analogous to columns (1) and (2), but
including ethnic xed e¤ects. In neither case are the results signicantly di¤erent from the benchmark
specications of Panel A of Table 2, although with ethnic xed e¤ects the standard errors increase, and
the signicance level is just below the 10% threshold. In columns (5)-(8) we perform the corresponding
analysis for Ethnic identity. The results are again robust.
5.3 Additional Controls
In Appendix Table 13 we show that the results are robust to the inclusion of additional controls,
namely past ghting events from 1997 to 1999, "trust in president" in 2008, and insecurity perceived
at the individual level during the last year before the 2008 survey. We explain these variables in
detail in the data appendix. We do not include these regressors in our main specications since (i)
past ghting is measured imprecisely as it covers only three years, due to data limitations; (ii) trust in
president is likely to be endogenous, and could even be regarded as an outcome variable; (iii) insecurity
may su¤er from selection-into-victimization bias and covers only the period 2007-2008. However, we
nd that our results are robust to the inclusion of these variables.
5.4 Other dimensions of trust
Finally, Appendix Table 14 replaces the dependent variable of Panel A of Table 2 (in particular, the
specication with ethnic xed e¤ects of columns (3),(6),(7),(8) and (9)) by Trust in known people
(columns (1)-(5)) and Trust in relatives (columns (6)-(10)), respectively. The estimates are in all
but one case insignicant. Interestingly, there is some evidence in the 2SLS estimates of a positive
e¤ect of ghting on trust in relatives, although this is never statistically signicant. This result is
partially di¤erent from Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), who nd that a past history of enslavement has
a negative e¤ect on all dimensions of trust, including trust in relatives. Our nding suggests that the
e¤ect of local ethnic conicts is less pervasive and mostly conned to the inter-ethnic dimension.25
24 In particular, this dummy codes as one all counties where Acholis are the largest ethnic group everywhere in the
territory according to GREG.
25We also nd that "Trust in known people" is more negatively a¤ected in ethnically diverse areas. In particular, in
OLS regressions we nd that, when we split the sample, in low-fractionalization counties the relationship between trust
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The ndings that conict leads to a stronger ethnic identity, and that it has a strong negative
and signicant impact on generalized trust, while having only a weak and non-signicant e¤ect on
trust in family, are consistent with the theoretical literature on the emergence of parochialism and
within-group bias in the face of inter-group conict (cf. Bowles and Gintis 2004; Choi and Bowles
2007).
6 Extensions
In this section, we consider two important extensions of the main specication.
6.1 Spatial-Ethnic Variation in Violence
So far the analysis has shown that violence across Ugandan counties is associated with a decrease
in trust towards other Ugandans and an increase in ethnic identity. In this section, we propose
complementary empirical strategies to address two related issues. First, we would like to cast more
light on the mechanism linking violence to the erosion of trust. The evidence we present could be driven
by the e¤ects of inter-ethnic violence on trust and ethnic identity, or simply by the mere exposure of
people to conict and violence, regardless of any ethnic dimension. Our theoretical research in Rohner,
Thoenig and Zilibotti (2013) links, more specically, the e¤ect of war on social capital to inter-ethnic
relationships. According to this view, peoples beliefs should respond to violence targeting their own
ethnic group rather than to generic violence occurring within their own county. We would like to test
whether there is more direct evidence of the ethnic channel. Second, the cross-county identication
is subject to the caveat that counties may have been subject to unobservable shocks correlated with
both a high incidence of conict and low trust. For example, during the period under consideration
the government might have reduced transfers or public goods to districts (or counties) populated by
hostile ethnic groups. Unfortunately, no direct measure of such government policies are available to
us.
To make progress in this direction, we exploit spatialethnic variations in violence. We use the
information provided by ACLED about the nature of each episode of conict event, each being classied
as involving specic rebel groups or ethnic militias, civilians, or the Ugandan army. Many rebel groups
have a main ethnic a¢ liation, e.g. if the ACLED data lists a "battle" between "Bafumbira Ethnic
Militia" and "Batooro Ethnic Militia", this event would be linked to both the Bafumbira and the
Batooro ethnic groups, and, for example, episodes involving the LRA can be linked to the Acholi
group. Therefore, we can associate most events with one or more ethnic groups involved, as well as
with the counties where they occurred.26 Having constructed such a variable, we identify the e¤ect
and ghting is insignicant, whereas in highly fractionalized areas it is negative and highly signicant. This is consistent
with a large proportion of known people being from other ethnic groups in fractionalized areas. However, these results
are not robust to TSLS where, due to very large standard errors, the di¤erences between high- and low-fractionalization
areas are insignicant. Since these results (which are available upon request) are not robust, we do not emphasize them.
26We have followed a conservative matching strategy, only linking events that can be attributed with a very high
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Dep. Var.: Generalized Trust Ethnic Identity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fight(OtherEth,Cou) -1.07 -0.21
(0.68) (0.56)
Fight(Eth,Cou) -0.71 0.78***
(0.75) (0.27)
Fight(Eth)*Fight(Cou) -0.31 1.83**
(0.67) (0.89)
Fight(Eth)*Radio -0.08** 0.07**
(0.04) (0.03)
Fixed Effects Ethnic County, Ethnic County*Ethnic Ethnic County, Ethnic County*Ethnic
Method Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Observations 2234 2341 2162 2217 2280 2136
R-squared 0.146 0.204 0.155 0.087 0.118 0.107
Note: The unit of observation is an individual. Standard errors in parenthesis (robust, clustered at county level). Significance
levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All specifications control for unreported individual sociodemographics (Age, Education,
Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV, Own Radio, 17 Religion Fixed Effects), and columns (1) and (4) for districts characteristics
at the beginning of the period (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population,
Urbanization, Age-Dependency-Ratio, Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming, Net Migration, Number of Micro-
Enterprises, Adjusted Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment Rate), and county characteristics at the beginning of the period
(Ethnic Fractionalization, Nightlight).
Table 8: Ethnic Fighting, Generalized Trust and Ethnic Identity.
of violence on trust and ethnic identity out of the within-county variation in the number of events
involving di¤erent ethnic groups, possibly after controlling for both county and ethnic group xed
e¤ects.
To begin with, column (1) and column (4) of Table 8 yield the results of the Probit specication of
Column (3) in Tables 1 and 3 after splitting the main independent variable All Fighting at the county-
level into events involving (i.e. Fight(Eth,Cou)) and not involving (i.e. Fight(OtherEth,Cou)) the
respondents ethnic group. In column (1) both estimated coe¢ cients are insignicant. Interestingly,
in column (4) the coe¢ cient of Fight(EthCou) (0.78) is positive and highly signicant while the
coe¢ cient of Fight(OtherEth,Cou) is negative and insignicant. This regression shows that ghting
episodes linked to a respondents own ethnic group have a stronger e¤ect on Ethnic identity than do
events involving other ethnic groups.
We consider, next, a specication including both county and ethnic xed e¤ects, where the e¤ect
of violence is identied by the interaction between the number of ghting events in the respondents
county and the number of ghting events throughout Uganda involving the respondents ethnic group:
Fight(Eth)*Fight(Cou). The hypothesis we test is that, within each ethnic group, ethnic identity
condence to particular groups. The results are similar when a more aggressive matching strategy is used, or when
particular rebel groups are removed. The matching table is available from the authors upon publication.
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(trust) is stronger (weaker) in counties that are subject to more intense ghting. Or identically:
within each county, ethnic identity (trust) is stronger (weaker) among people belonging to ethnic
groups more actively involved in ghting nationwide.27 The results are presented in columns (2)
for Generalized trust and (5) for Ethnic identity. The point estimates of the interaction e¤ects are,
as expected, negative (-0.31) and positive (1.83), respectively, although only the coe¢ cient in the
regression for Ethnic identity is statistically signicant (at the 5% level).
In the main specication of the previous section, we focused on the e¤ects of violence that occurred
in the respondents county. This is a plausible assumption, since our All ghting variable codes even
minor episodes about which knowledge is unlikely to be shared by all Ugandans. However, well-
informed individuals may be a¤ected by news of ethnic violence involving their group anywhere in
Uganda. To test this hypothesis, we include an interaction between the ownership of a radio and
the number of ghting events nationwide involving the respondents group (Fight(Eth)*Radio). This
interaction enables us to run an even more demanding specication controlling for the interaction
between ethnic and county xed e¤ects. The results are shown in n columns (3) and (6). As expected,
the coe¢ cient of Fight(Eth)*Radio is negative and signicant in the case of Generalized trust, and
positive and signicant in the case of Ethnic identity. People owning a radio are more reactive to
the news of violence involving their own ethnic group anywhere in Uganda. This result is related to
the growing literature on the politico-economic e¤ects of mass media pioneered by Strömberg (2004).
Recent applications to ethnic conict include Della Vigna et al. (2011), and Yanagizawa-Drott (2012),
focusing respectively on partisan radio broadcasting in the Serbo-Croatian and Rwandan conicts.
These papers show that an exogenous increase in the exposure to radical news a¤ects attitudes towards
ongoing conicts. Note, though, that we do not try to identify exogenous variation in the exposure
to radio broadcasting. Thus, the e¤ect identied by our regression could reect, in part, some self-
selection of individuals in the decision to own a radio.
In conclusion, this extension shows that the ethnic channel plays an important role. The within-
county results rule out that the increase in ethnic identity is driven by targeted government policies,
e.g., the government spending less on hostile districts or counties.
6.2 The Heterogeneous E¤ects of Conict on Economic Activity
In this extension, we study the e¤ect of violence on economic performance. The ideal dependent
variable would be GDP per capita at the county (or district) level, but these data are not available
in Uganda. Therefore, we proxy GDP by light intensity nighttime according to Satellite Nightlight
Data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2010). Nightlight data have been
27The main e¤ects of Fight(Eth) and Fight(Cou) are now absorbed by the county and ethnic xed e¤ects and cannot
be estimated separately. If we omit the xed e¤ects, the estimated coe¢ cients of Fight(Eth) and Fight(Cou) are negative
and signicant at the 95% level (-1.27, s.e. 0.50, and -0.12, s.e. 0.06, respectively) in the case of general trust, and positive
but insignicant (0.55, s.e. 0.34, and 0.03, s.e. 0.04) in the case of ethnic identity. If one adds the interaction term
Fight(Eth)*Fight(Cou) to this specication without xed e¤ects, the estimated main e¤ects Fight(Eth) and Fight(Cou)
remain negative and signicant (positive and insignicant) for the case of general trust (ethnic identity), while the
interaction coe¢ cient is in both cases insignicant.
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used in recent research as a proxy for economic activity (see, for example Henderson, Storeygard, and
Weil 2012, and Hodler and Raschky 2011). We include the details of the data construction are in the
Appendix.
The focal point of our analysis is the extent to which post-conict recovery is heterogeneous across
counties of di¤erent ethnic fractionalization. In particular we hypothesize that if conict destroys trust
and forges strong ethnic identities, the more fractionalized counties would su¤er stronger and more
persistent economic e¤ects because of their heavier reliance on inter-ethnic business relations that are
disrupted by the erosion of trust.
Since Satellite nightlight, the dependent variable, is measured at the county level we cannot con-
dition on any individual-level information.28 We estimate the following specication
NIGHTLIGHT 08c = 0 + 1NIGHTLIGHT
00
c + 2FIGHTING
00 08
c + 3FRACc (2)
+4FIGHTING
00 08
c  FRACc + uc:
We use a Tobit regressor rather than an OLS, since satellite light data are censored at zero. In all
specications, the main coe¢ cient of interest is 4:
The results are reported in Table 9. Column (1) shows that the main e¤ect of All ghting on
satellite light in 2008 is negative, but statistically insignicant. Column (2) shows that there is a neg-
ative and signicant interaction e¤ect: Fighting a¤ects Satellite light negatively in highly ethnically
fractionalized counties. Since the main e¤ects are measured at a zero level of fractionalization, the in-
signicant coe¢ cient on All ghting indicates that violence has no economic e¤ect in non-fractionalized
counties.
As usual, it is di¢ cult to instrument the interaction term. To make progress in this direction, we
follow Besley and Persson (2011) and split the sample into high- and low-fractionalization counties,
instrumenting in each specication All ghting with the same geographic characteristics as before.
Since 47% of the counties have zero fractionalization, and 75% have a measure of fractionalization
below 23%, we set the threshold at the top quartile. Thus, the sample of low-fractionalization (high-
fractionalization) counties consists of the three lowest quartiles (respectively, top quartile). The coe¢ -
cients of interest are now the main e¤ects of All ghting, separately for low- and high-fractionalization
counties, in columns (3)-(4) of Table 9, respectively. Fighting is associated with a large and signicant
decline in living conditions in high-fractionalization counties (column (4)), and with no signicant e¤ect
in less fractionalized counties (column (3)).29 The coe¢ cient of All ghting in high-fractionalization
counties is more than thirteen times larger. In the last three columns of Table 9 we show that the
results are similar for alternative measures of ghting.30
28Note that in this regression we cannot control for ethnic xed e¤ects, since the dependent variable is measured at
the county level.
29The small sample size in the split sample reduces the power of the rst-stage regression. The Kleibergen-Paap F-stats
are well below ten, raising a concern of a weak-instrument bias.
30The results are very similar if one controls for the district-averages of our past trust and ethnic identity variables
from the 2000 Afrobarometer survey.
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Dependent variable: Nightlight in 2008
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Nightlight (2000) 0.83*** 0.84*** 0.81*** 0.94*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 0.82***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
All fighting -0.72 -0.44 -1.08 -15.00***
(1.32) (1.32) (1.78) (5.21)
Ethnic frac. 0.04 0.15 3.15 0.24 0.14 0.12 0.11
(0.13) (0.13) (1.95) (0.23) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Fighting*Frac -29.83**
(13.67)
Civ. viol. -0.54
(3.05)
Civ.*Frac -68.43**
(30.26)
Battles -0.54
(2.06)
Battles*Frac -47.26*
(27.12)
IDP -0.10
(0.15)
IDP*Frac -10.40***
(3.97)
Method Tobit Tobit IVTobit IVTobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Sample All All Low Frac. High Frac. All All All
Observations 125 125 75 43 125 125 125
Log Pseudolikelihood -21.64 -19.18 150.26 154.07 -19.03 -19.82 -18.18
Note: The unit of observation is a county. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01. All specifications control for  districts characteristics at the beginning of the period (Population, Urbanization, Age-
Dependency-Ratio, Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming, Net Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises, Adjusted
Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment Rate), and county characteristics at the beginning of the period (Ethnic Fractionalization,
Nightlight).
Table 9: Explaining Living Conditions proxied by Satellite Nightlight in 2008.
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The nding that ethnic violence dating back to 2002-05 has a negative e¤ect on economic outcomes
measured in 2008 in ethnically fractionalized counties, is consistent with the view that conict hinders
economic cooperation in ethnically divided societies. The evidence suggests that violence has weaker
e¤ects on economic cooperation when violence does not involve ethnic cleavages. In other words,
violence appears to have more persistent e¤ects in ethnically divided areas.
In the working paper version of this study (Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti 2012), we show the results
of regressions using an alternative proxy of living standards as the dependent variable. In particular,
we use individual responses to a question contained in Afrobarometer 2008 about perceived living
conditions. As we note in that version, the main limitation of this alternative proxy is its subjective
nature. It may easily be biased by non-economic determinants of well-being, including the state of
inter-ethnic relationships within local communities. The results we obtained with the alternative proxy
line up with those outlined here.31
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the e¤ect of civil conict on social capital, focusing on the experience of
Uganda during the last decade. Using individual and county-level data, we document causal e¤ects of
an outburst of civil conict in 2002-05, driven by an exogenous shock linked to US foreign policy, on
post-conict trust and ethnic identity. We nd that the extent of ghting has a strong and statistically
signicant negative impact on Trust towards other Ugandans between 2000 and 2008. The estimated
e¤ect is quantitatively large and robust to a number of control variables, alternative measures of
violence and di¤erent statistical techniques. People living in districts experiencing more violence also
report a strong increase in Ethnic identity, i.e., they identify themselves more strongly with their own
ethnic group relative to alternative a¢ liations. Thus, conict appears to strengthen within-ethnic
group ties. This nding is consistent with the evidence in other studies that social capital is fueled by
external wars: countries acquire a stronger internal cohesion.
Our results are robust to various specications, including instrumental variable strategy. Further,
the ndings overall all robust to a demanding identication strategy relying on the variation within
each district in the ethnic violence involving di¤erent ethnic groups.
We also study post-conict economic recovery. Four years after the end of the major conict, the
intensity of ghting had negative economic e¤ects in highly fractionalized counties, but no e¤ects
in lowly fractionalized counties. This observation is suggestive of a negative e¤ect of ethnic conict
on inter-ethnic economic cooperation, and is consistent with the predictions of our companion paper
(Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti 2013).
In future work, we plan to extend the approach in this paper to the study of civil conicts in other
31 In particular, ghting a¤ects negatively living standards in ethnically fractionalized counties. In contrast, violence
has no e¤ect in non-fractionalized counties. When ethnic xed e¤ects are included, all interaction e¤ects have the
expected sign, but most are statistically insignicant. The fact that the specication using the subjective measure of
living standards yields less robust results is not surprising, given the noisier nature of this variable.
34
African countries, and to consider the role of alliance networks between combatant groups.
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Appendix A (not for publication): Additional Tables and Figures
In this Appendix we provide a number of additional tables that are referred to in the text.
Dep.var: Generalized Trust in 2008 (Second stage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All fighting -4.34*** -4.08* -4.70** -5.00**
(1.22) (2.23) (2.27) (1.99)
Dist. from Sudan 0.52*** 0.29* 0.44*
(0.18) (0.15) (0.23)
Ethnic controls No Ethn. Var. Ethnic FE No Ethn. Var. Ethnic FE No
Method 2SLS (LIML) 2SLS (LIML) 2SLS (LIML) OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Observations 2252 2141 2252 2252 2141 2252 117
R-squared 0.112 0.125 0.155 0.123 0.145 0.181 0.366
F stat. (Kleibergen-Paap) 19.744 15.677 9.061 n/a n/a n/a n/a
F stat. (Cragg-Donald) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 17.368
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust, two-way clustered at county and ethnicity level in columns (1)-(6)). Significance
levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 10: Robustness of IV regressions.
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Dep. var.: Generalized Trust in 2008 Ethnic Identity in 2008
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All fighting -4.01** -4.91*** -4.47 -7.04 3.85*** 3.83*** 7.82*** 8.11***
(1.67) (1.58) (3.54) (4.48) (1.38) (1.13) (1.35) (0.65)
Ethnic controls No No Ethnic FE Ethnic FE No No Ethnic FE Ethnic FE
Method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Sample w/o AchGREG w/o AchETHN w/o AchGREG w/o AchETHN w/o AchGREG w/o AchETHN w/o AchGREG w/o AchETHN
Observations 1966 2156 1966 2156 1973 2163 1973 2163
R-squared 0.143 0.129 0.196 0.163 0.057 0.050 0.071 0.035
Note: The unit of observation is an individual. Robust standard errors in parenthesis (adjusted for two-way clustering at county and ethnicity level).
Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All specifications control for unreported individual sociodemographics (Age, Education, Employed,
Gender, Rural, Own TV, Own Radio, 17 Religion Fixed Effects), districts characteristics at the beginning of the period (Past Generalized Trust, Past
Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urbanization, Age-Dependency-Ratio, Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming, Net
Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises, Adjusted Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment Rate), and county characteristics at the beginning of the period
(Ethnic Fractionalization, Nightlight).
Table 12: Robustness to removing Acholi regions.
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Dep. Var.: Generalized Trust Ethnic Identity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All fighting -7.79* -5.55*** -4.43* 6.87*** 4.97*** 3.95***
(4.34) (2.08) (2.26) (1.73) (1.69) (1.11)
Addit. Control Past Fighting Trust in Pres. Insecure Past Fighting Trust in Pres. Insecure
Method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 2252 2169 2252 2259 2176 2259
R-squared 0.139 0.149 0.161 0.038 0.061 0.068
Note: The unit of observation is an individual. Robust standard errors in parenthesis (adjusted for two-way
clustering at county and ethnicity level). Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All specifications
control for unreported individual sociodemographics (Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV, Own
Radio, 17 Religion Fixed Effects, 28 Ethnicity Fixed Effects), districts characteristics at the beginning of the period
(Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urbanization, Age-
Dependency-Ratio, Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming, Net Migration, Number of Micro-
Enterprises, Adjusted Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment Rate), and county characteristics at the beginning of
the period (Ethnic Fractionalization, Nightlight).
Table 13: Robustness to additional controls.
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Trust in Known People Trust in Relatives
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
All fighting -0.67 0.79 -0.94*** 0.99
(0.62) (3.46) (0.19) (1.45)
Violence Civil. 1.93 2.40
(8.37) (3.35)
Battles 1.30 1.62
(5.67) (2.44)
IDP 0.15 0.18
(0.65) (0.26)
Method OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 2250 2250 2250 2250 2250 2257 2257 2257 2257 2257
R-squared 0.115 0.112 0.113 0.112 0.112 0.086 0.075 0.077 0.074 0.082
Note: The unit of observation is an individual. Robust standard errors in parenthesis (adjusted for two-way clustering at county and ethnicity
level). Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All specifications control for unreported individual sociodemographics (Age, Education,
Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV, Own Radio, 17 Religion Fixed Effects, 28 Ethnicity Fixed Effects), districts characteristics at the beginning of
the period (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urbanization, Age-Dependency-Ratio, Share of
Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming, Net Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises, Adjusted Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment Rate),
and county characteristics at the beginning of the period (Ethnic Fractionalization, Nightlight).
Table 14: E¤ect of Fighting onTrust in Known People and in Relatives.
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Dep. Var: Generalized Trust Ethnic Identity
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4)
All fighting -3.73*** -4.42* 3.23*** 5.04**
(1.31) (2.62) (1.10) (1.98)
Ethnic controls No Ethnic FE No Ethnic FE
Method IVProbit IVProbit IVProbit IVProbit
Observations 2242 2234 2256 2217
Log Pseudolikelihood 3928.5228 4441.5994 4142.3388 4541.1318
Note:  The unit of observation is an individual. Standard errors in parenthesis (robust, clustered at county level).
Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All specifications control for unreported individual
sociodemographics (Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV, Own Radio, 17 Religion Fixed Effects),
districts characteristics at the beginning of the period (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic
Identity, Population, Urbanization, Age-Dependency-Ratio, Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming, Net
Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises, Adjusted Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment Rate), and county
characteristics at the beginning of the period (Ethnic Fractionalization, Nightlight).
Table 15: Robustness to using IVProbit.
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Figure 4: Distance to Sudan and Ethnic Identity
8 Appendix B (not for publication): Data
First the dependent trust variables:
Generalized trust (in 2008): This is a dummy variable varying on the individual level and taking
a value of 1 if "I trust them somewhat" or "I trust them a lot" is answered to the question "How
much do you trust each of the following types of people: Other Ugandans?" from the Afrobarometer
2008 (question Q84C).
Ethnic identity (in 2008): This is a dummy variable varying on the individual level and taking
a value of 1 if "I feel only (Rs ethnic group)" or "I feel more (Rs ethnic group) than Ugandan" is
answered to the question "Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Ugandan and being
a _ [Rs Ethnic Group]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings?" from the Afrobarometer
2008 (question Q83).
Trust in Known People (in 2008): This is a dummy variable varying on the individual level
and taking a value of 1 if "I trust them somewhat" or "I trust them a lot" is answered to the question
"How much do you trust each of the following types of people: Other people you know?" from the
Afrobarometer 2008 (question Q84B).
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Trust and identity variables:
Trust generalized 2008 2424 .3180693 .4658226 0 1
Ethnic identity 2008 2431 .2073221 .4054717 0 1
Trust known people 2008 2422 .5396367 .4985294 0 1
Trust relatives 2008 2429 .8369699 .3694692 0 1
Trust president 2008 2342 0.582835 0.493196 0 1
Trust generalized 2000 2279 .1553152 .1020895 0 .34375
Trust own group 2000 2279 .8197781 .1325227 .4722222 1
Trust in others 2000 2279 .7015967 .1357914 .3958333 .9375
Ethnic identity 2000 2279 0.1212459 0.0804707 0 0.319
Fighting variables (main specifications):
All Fighting events 2431 21.3262 45.9608 0 227
Violence against civilians events 2431 7.946935 16.83046 0 94
Battle events 2431 9.881119 26.42823 0 141
All Fighting fatalities 2431 73.3003 164.639 0 921
Violence against civilians fatalities 2431 32.5245 77.2973 0 451
Battle fatalities 2431 30.6434 90.3819 0 513
IDP 2431 0.0993206 0.250148 0 0.946
Individual socio-demographic variables:
Age 2421 33.70921 12.28614 18 81
Education 2431 .4960921 .5000876 0 1
Own TV 2428 .1214992 .3267738 0 1
Own radio 2430 .7353909 .4412156 0 1
Employed 2431 .3973673 .4894539 0 1
Female 2431 1.499383 .5001025 1 2
Urban 2431 1.79926 .4006367 1 2
Insecure 2431 0.206911 0.405174 0 1
District level variables:
Population (in 100000) 2431 5.565170 2.828750 1.271 11.891
Urbanization 2431 13.28453 22.4144 1.1 100
Age Dependency Ratio 2431 110.7223 14.7269 64.2 132.8
Manufacturing Share 2431 2.39239 1.952001 .2 9.5
Subsistence Farming 2431 30.64801 21.05091 7.5 97.9
Net Migration (in 1000) 2431 0.125093 5.878295 -11.4 17.5
Number of Micro Enterprises 2431 28.193400 22.450400 3.952 103.913
Adjusted Fertility Rate 2431 6.964583 0.967756 4 8.2
Unemployment 2431 4.572151 3.145646 0.8 15.4
County level variables:
Fractionalization 2431 0.131371 0.188514 0 0.666
Satellite Light 2000 2431 0.767631 1.780030 0 7.118
Satellite Light 2008 2431 0.692970 1.696720 0 6.754
Ethnic group variables:
Ln slave exports per area 2431 0.032393 0.067820 0 0.849
Hunting 2317 0.886923 0.461082 0 2
Fishing 2317 0.750108 0.804326 0 3
Animal Husbandry 2317 2.450580 1.113890 1 4
Agriculture 2317 5.800170 0.825040 4 7
Instrument:
Distance from Sudan (in km) 2431 271.0786 132.5202 0 529.758
Table 16: Descriptive Statistics.
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Trust in relatives (in 2008): This is a dummy variable varying on the individual level and taking
a value of 1 if "I trust them somewhat" or "I trust them a lot" is answered to the question "How
much do you trust each of the following types of people: Your relatives?" from the Afrobarometer
2008 (question Q84A).
The independent trust variables:
Generalized trust (in 2000): This is a continuous district level variable that gives the percentage
of respondents in a given district who answer "Most people can be trusted" to the question "Generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing
with people?" from the Afrobarometer 2000 (question Q59).
Ethnic identity (in 2000): This is a continuous district level variable that gives the percentage
of respondents in a given district who answer "Ethnic" to the question "We have spoken to many
Ugandans and they have all described themselves in di¤erent ways. Some people describe themselves
in terms of their region, language, ethnic group, religion, or gender. Others describe themselves in
economic terms, such as working class, middle class, or according to their occupation (e.g. a farmer
or a housewife). Besides being Ugandan, which specic group do you feel you belong to rst and
foremost?" from the Afrobarometer 2000 (question Q18).
Trust in other groups (in 2000): This is a continuous district level variable that gives the
percentage of respondents in a given district who answer "I trust them somewhat" or "I trust them a
lot" to the question "I am now going to read you a list of people and organizations. How much do you
trust each of them to do what is right? Ugandans from other ethnic groups" from the Afrobarometer
2000 (question Q60B).
Trust in own group (in 2000): This is a continuous district level variable that gives the
percentage of respondents in a given district who answer "I trust them somewhat" or "I trust them a
lot" to the question "I am now going to read you a list of people and organizations. How much do you
trust each of them to do what is right? Someone from your own ethnic group" from the Afrobarometer
2000 (question Q60A).
Trust in President (in 2008): This is a dummy variable varying on the individual level and
taking a value of 1 if "Somewhat" or "A lot" is answered to the question "How much do you trust
each of the following, or havent you heard enough about them to say: The President?" from the
Afrobarometer 2008 (question Q49A). It is coded as missing when "Dont know/Havent heard enough"
is answered, and 0 otherwise.
The ghting variables:
Fighting (County): Taking the ACLED (2011) dataset, we have generated with the help of
ArcGIS the number of violent events (resp. fatalities) per county. In particular, this variable varies
on the county level, and corresponds to the total amount of all violent events (fatalities) in a county
taking place between the last day of the Afrobarometer 2000 survey (on June 26, 2000) and the rst
day of the Afrobarometer 2008 survey (on July 27, 2008). It corresponds to the sum of the events
(fatalities) of the following "Event Type": "Battle-Government regains territory", "Battle-No change
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of territory", "Battle-Rebels gain territory", "Riots/Protests", and "Violence against civilians".
Violence Against Civilians (County): Taking the ACLED (2011) dataset, we have generated
with the help of ArcGIS the number of violent events (resp. fatalities) per county. In particular, this
variable varies on the county level, and corresponds to the total amount of all events (fatalities) of
the "Event Type" of "Violence against civilians" in a county taking place between the last day of the
Afrobarometer 2000 survey (on June 26, 2000) and the rst day of the Afrobarometer 2008 survey (on
July 27, 2008).
Battles (County): Taking the ACLED (2011) dataset, we have generated with the help of ArcGIS
the number of violent events (resp. fatalities) per county. In particular, this variable varies on the
county level, and corresponds to the total amount of all battle events (fatalities) in a county taking
place between the last day of the Afrobarometer 2000 survey (on June 26, 2000) and the rst day of
the Afrobarometer 2008 survey (on July 27, 2008). Concretely, it corresponds to the sum of the events
(fatalities) of the following "Event Type": "Battle-Government regains territory", "Battle-No change
of territory", and "Battle-Rebels gain territory".
Internally Displaced People (IDP): Total number of internally displaced people per district
in 2006 (From UNHCR, 2006).
Fighting (Ethnicity): Taking the ACLED (2011) dataset, we have matched all ghting events
to a particular ethnicity (Q79) in the Afrobarometer 2008 survey (where feasible). In particular, this
variable varies on the ethnicity level, and corresponds to the total amount of all violent events linked to
an ethnic group taking place between the last day of the Afrobarometer 2000 survey (on June 26, 2000)
and the rst day of the Afrobarometer 2008 survey (on July 27, 2008). It corresponds to the sum of
the events of the following "Event Type": "Battle-Government regains territory", "Battle-No change
of territory", "Battle-Rebels gain territory", "Riots/Protests", and "Violence against civilians".
Fighting (Ethnicity, County): Taking the ACLED (2011) dataset, we have generated with the
help of ArcGIS the number of violent events per county and ethnicity (Q79). In particular, this variable
varies on the county and ethnicity level, and corresponds to the total amount of all violent events in
a county and linked to a given ethnic group taking place between the last day of the Afrobarometer
2000 survey (on June 26, 2000) and the rst day of the Afrobarometer 2008 survey (on July 27,
2008). It corresponds to the sum of the events of the following "Event Type": "Battle-Government
regains territory", "Battle-No change of territory", "Battle-Rebels gain territory", "Riots/Protests",
and "Violence against civilians".
Past Fighting (1997-1999): Taking the ACLED (2011) dataset, we have generated with the help
of ArcGIS the number of violent events per county. In particular, this variable varies on the county
level, and corresponds to the total amount of all violent events in a county taking place in the years
1997-1999. It corresponds to the sum of the events of the following "Event Type": "Battle-Government
regains territory", "Battle-No change of territory", "Battle-Rebels gain territory", "Riots/Protests",
and "Violence against civilians".
Additional individual level variables:
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Age: Continuous variable that varies on the individual level. Answer to the question "How old
are you?" (question Q1) of the Afrobarometer 2008.
Education: Dummy variable that varies on the individual level. Takes a value of 1 if the respon-
dent indicates at least an education level of 4 in the question Q89 of the Afrobarometer 2008.
Employed: Dummy variable that varies on the individual level. From Afrobarometer 2008. It
takes a value of 1 if "yes" (answer categories 2, 3, 4, and 5) is answered to the question "Do you have
a job that pays a cash income?" (question Q94).
Gender: Variable that varies on the individual level. 1=Male, 2=Female. From question Q101 of
the Afrobarometer 2008.
Rural: Variable that varies on the individual level. 1=Urban, 2=Rural. From question URBRUR
of the Afrobarometer 2008.
Own Radio: Dummy variable that varies on the individual level. From Afrobarometer 2008.
It takes a value of 1 if "Yes (Do own)" is answered to the question "Which of these things do you
personally own: Radio?" (question Q92A).
Own TV: Dummy variable that varies on the individual level. From Afrobarometer 2008. It takes
a value of 1 if "Yes (Do own)" is answered to the question "Which of these things do you personally
own: Television?" (question Q92B).
Insecure: This is a dummy variable varying on the individual level and taking a value of 0
if "Never" is answered and a value of 1 if "Just once or twice", "Several times", "Many times",
"Always", or "Dont know" is answered to the question "Over the past year, how often, if ever, have
you or anyone in your family: Been physically attacked?" from the Afrobarometer 2008 (question
Q9C).
Additional district level variables:
Adjusted Total Fertility Rate: Adjusted total fertility rate in a given district in 2002. From
the Census 2002 (Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, 2002).
Age Dependency Ratio: Age dependency ratio in district in 2002. From the Census 2002
(Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, 2002).
Net migration: Net migration in a given district in 2002. From the Census 2002 (Ugandan
Bureau of Statistics, 2002).
Number of Micro-Enterprises: Number of micro-enterprises in a given district in 2002. From
the Census 2002 (Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, 2002).
Population: Total population in district in 2002. From the Census 2002 (Ugandan Bureau of
Statistics, 2002).
Share of Manufacture: Percentage of working population that are in the manufacturing sector
in a given district in 2002. From the Census 2002 (Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, 2002).
Share of Subsistence Farming: Percentage of working population that are in subsistence farm-
ing in a given district in 2002. From the Census 2002 (Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, 2002).
Unemployment Rate: Unemployment rate in a given district in 2002. From the Census 2002
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(Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, 2002).
Urbanization: Urbanization rate in district in 2002. From the Census 2002 (Ugandan Bureau of
Statistics, 2002).
Additional county level variables:
Ethnic Fractionalization: This is a continuous county level variable that varies between 0 and
1. Using the Geo-Referenced Ethnic Group (GREG) dataset (Weidmann, Rød and Cederman, 2010),
we obtain with the help of ArcGIS the percentage of the area of a given county that is occupied
by a given ethnic group. For each county fractionalization is computed using the following formula:
FRAC =
nP
i=1
sharei  (1  sharei).
Satellite nightlight (in 2000): The data comes from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (2010). We use their data on Average Visible, Stable Lights, & Cloud Free Coverages
of their satellite F15/F16. In particular, we use their "cleaned" and "ltered" version of the data,
which "contains the lights from cities, towns, and other sites with persistent lighting, including gas
ares. Ephemeral events, such as res have been discarded. Then the background noise was identied
and replaced with values of zero. Data values range from 1-63." Using ArcGIS we generate the county
level average nightlight intensity.
Satellite nightlight (in 2008): The data comes from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (2010). We use their data on Average Visible, Stable Lights, & Cloud Free Coverages
of their satellite F15/F16. In particular, we use their "cleaned" and "ltered" version of the data,
which "contains the lights from cities, towns, and other sites with persistent lighting, including gas
ares. Ephemeral events, such as res have been discarded. Then the background noise was identied
and replaced with values of zero. Data values range from 1-63." Using ArcGIS we generate the county
level average nightlight intensity.
The ethnic group variables:
Slave Exports by Area: Slavery is borrowed from Nunn and Wantchekon (2011). It measures
the number of people who were enslaved during the slave trade period (1400-1900) in each ethnic group,
normalized by the area of land inhabited by the group during the 19th century. This is the main slave
trade variable from Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), i.e. ln(1+[number of slave exports]/area).
Hunting: Indicates the traditional ethnic-group specic dependence on hunting (including trap-
ping and fowling), coded on a cardinal scale between 0 and 9. This variable is borrowed from
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013), and corresponds to variable v2 of the Ethnographic Atlas
of Murdock (1967). A value of 0 corresponds to a dependence to 0-5%, 1 corresponds to 6-15%, 2
to 16-25%, 3 to 26-35%, 4 to 36-45%, 5 to 46-55%, 6 to 56-65%, 7 to 66-75%, 8 to 76-85%, and 9 to
86-100%.
Fishing: Indicates the traditional ethnic-group specic dependence on shing (including shell
shing and the pursuit of large aquatic animals), coded on a cardinal scale between 0 and 9. This
variable is borrowed from Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013), and corresponds to variable v3 of
the Ethnographic Atlas of Murdock (1967). The scale is the same as for Hunting.
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Animal husbandry: Indicates the traditional ethnic-group specic dependence on animal hus-
bandry, coded on a cardinal scale between 0 and 9. This variable is borrowed from Michalopoulos and
Papaioannou (2013), and corresponds to variable v4 of the Ethnographic Atlas of Murdock (1967).
The scale is the same as for Hunting.
Agriculture: Indicates the traditional ethnic-group specic dependence on agriculture (including
penetration of the soil, planting, tending the growing crops, and harvesting), coded on a cardinal
scale between 0 and 9. This variable is borrowed from Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013), and
corresponds to variable v5 of the Ethnographic Atlas of Murdock (1967). The scale is the same as for
Hunting.
Fixed e¤ects:
Ethnic FE: From variable Q79 ("What is your tribe? You know, your ethnic or cultural group.")
of Afrobarometer 2008.
Religion FE: From variable Q90 ("What is your religion, if any?") of Afrobarometer 2008.
Instrument:
Distance to Sudan: We construct this variable by computing with ArcGIS the minimum distance
between the geo-referenced border of a given county and the geo-referenced border of Sudan.
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